Societal Constitutionalism: From Context to Theory

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Public Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

2 Assistant Professor of Public Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

3 PhD in Public Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

10.22091/cpl.2026.14912.1088

Abstract

The emergence of the theory of societal constitutionalism may be understood as a response to the concern for according legitimacy to diverse forms of social rationality. Evidently, the necessity of envisaging an order independent of politics for the sphere of the economy, which was articulated in the early twentieth century through the idea of a fiscal constitution, played a significant role in the acceptance of the distinctive logic of social systems. Likewise, the foundations and doctrines of legal pluralism effectively paved the way for the expansion of the scope of constitutionalism. Ultimately, these intellectual endeavors found reflection in the Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory and were further developed, from the perspective of David Sciulli, through the procedural understanding of law advanced by Jürgen Habermas and Lon L. Fuller. According to Luhmann, rather than concentrating on the distinction between the state and society, society ought to be conceived as consisting of various social systems, such as the economy, politics, education, and law, each of which, despite possessing an autopoietic and self-regulating character, is inevitably required to establish a structural coupling with its surrounding environment. In this respect, the threat posed by the encroachment of systems on one another’s shperes necessitates the anticipation of self-limitation mechanisms, while simultaneously maintaining equilibrium with the surrounding. In this manner, constitutionalism, which had long been designated solely to confront state power, continues to exist faithfuly to the various dimensions of collective life. The final finding of this study, developed in light of its pedagogy-oriented methodology and sociological analysis, is that the key to overcoming the deficiencies of traditional constitutional theories in confronting contemporary manifestations of power lies not in the formulation of a global constitutional order, but rather, conversely, in the recognition of the plurality of social systems and the particular rationality inherent in each of them

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